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 1 
America First and the Populist Impact on US Foreign Policy 
 
Abstract: This article examines the impact of populism on US foreign policy under the Trump 
presidency. First, the article considers how the framing of America First successfully exploited 
a long-standing gap between public opinion and the foreign policy establishment in on the 
extent of American global engagement. Second, the article explores how America First has 
combined populist anti-elitism with nationalist anti-globalism, establishing hostility towards 
the liberal international order as its most significant, consistent and politically relevant theme. 
In its emphasis of Jacksonian unilateralism and neoconservative primacy, America First, at the 
same time, has promoted a considerable degree of continuity, resulting in a persistent 
disconnect between populist rhetoric and foreign policy practice. Third, the article concludes 
that America First has successfully challenged the bipartisan elite consensus on liberal 
hegemony and the ideological dominance of the foreign policy establishment, significantly 




The election of Donald Trump as President of the United States and the success of Brexit in 
the EU referendum campaign in the United Kingdom are the most prominent examples of a 
populist disruption of the status quo in international politics in recent times, which 
subsequently led to a marked increase of interest in the topic of populism, both in terms of 
global media coverage and the academic literature on the subject.1 In the past, populism has 
predominantly been viewed as domestic political issue in terms of voter mobilization, its 
impact on liberal democratic systems and the comparisons that can be drawn between populist 
movements and leaders, with a particular focus on  the development of populism in Europe and 
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Latin America.2 Populism and its impact on foreign policy and national security have so far 
garnered relatively little attention, and there has been few interaction between populism studies 
and adjacent fields in political science, such as international relations (IR) and security studies 
that focus on foreign policy.3  
 
President Trump’s sustained attacks on key institutions of liberal democracy, political 
opponents, the Washington ‘swamp’ and the media; his repeatedly voiced disdain for 
multilateralism, international organisations immigration and ‘globalism’; his emphasis on a 
transactional view of international relations that prioritizes the national interest of the United 
States against both rivals and allies and partners; and a highly personalized style of political 
communication that claims ‘I am the only one, who matters’, suggest that the ideational 
repertoire of nationalist populism is a persistent and distinctive element of Trump’s political 
views that should be relevant for the conceptualization of US foreign policy.4 Beyond the issue, 
of how Trump has framed his particular brand of American populism by identifying systemic 
economic and political failure with the establishment, establishing an antagonistic relationship 
between corrupt elites and ordinary Americans, and utilizing emotional triggers of fear, anger 
and resentment, such an analysis needs to consider to what extent populism informs the 
America First discourse relative to other themes, such as nationalism, realism or protectionism, 
and how it has affected overall US foreign policy outcomes in praxis.5  
 
To this end, the article will progress as follows. First, it will argue that the nationalist populist 
framing of America First has successfully exploited a long-standing gap between public 
opinion  and the foreign policy establishment in the United States on the extent of US global 
engagement, while Trump’s anti-globalist, anti-immigration and protectionist agenda 
simultaneously responded to the specific sense of political alienation, economic insecurity and 
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cultural anxiety felt by predominantly White male non-College educated voters, who form the 
core of Trump’s support base. Relying on a range of public opinion surveys, the article 
identifies partisan polarization and dissatisfaction of Trump voters with globalization, 
immigration and demographic change as significant elements of popular support for America 
First’s anti-establishment and anti-globalist messaging. Second, the article examines how on 
the discursive level America First has combined populist anti-elitism with nationalist anti-
globalism, establishing hostility towards the liberal international order as its most significant, 
consistent and politically relevant element. However, while anti-globalism informs both 
Trump’s protectionism and anti-immigration policies, at the same time, there is a disconnect 
between the nationalist populist rhetoric of systemic change and US foreign policy outcomes, 
as the United States under Trump continues to broadly support a grand strategy of American 
primacy with a traditional neoconservative emphasis on national sovereignty and military 
supremacy that promotes a considerable degree of policy continuity.  As such, America First 
can neither be classified as a coherent Trump Doctrine, nor as a realist strategy of restraint or 
offshore balancing.  
 
Third, the article argues that the most significant impact of Trump’s populism has been on the 
ideational level, both regarding global perceptions of the international leadership role of the 
United States and its diminishing reliability and credibility, and in boosting the internal debate 
on the future of US foreign policy and the viability of restraint as a strategic alternative. 
America First has challenged the dominant position of liberal hegemony and the political 
hegemony of the foreign policy establishment by publicly legitimating and partially executing 
an alternative conceptualization of America’s role in world politics that broke with over seven 
decades of bipartisan consensus on the necessity and desirability of American leadership of  a 
liberal international order.  
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Populism, US Foreign Policy and the Public Opinion Gap 
 
Populism has notoriously been difficult to precisely define and categorize, with some authors 
casting it as an essentially contested or fragmented concept.6 The political theorist Ernesto 
Laclau, for example, characterized the ‘vagueness and imprecision’ of populism as ‘essential 
component’ of its operation, given the necessity to subsume a complex social reality of 
competing political claims and antagonistic relationships under a homogenous identification 
of the ‘people’.7 Populism as a result is not a fixed, coherent and consistent ideological belief 
system on how to order social relations or initiate political and institutional reform, but a 
relatively flexible political mode that can adapt to the particularities of national contexts and 
specific economic grievances and cultural anxieties in the name of reclaiming popular 
sovereignty. At its core, populism operates as a rhetorical device or discourse that separates 
society into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ and the ‘the corrupt 
elite’ that have betrayed them.8 An idealized community of ‘hard-working, God-fearing, 
patriotic citizens’ is represented as only legitimate carrier of popular sovereignty, which in turn 
has its sole political representation in the figure of the populist leader, party or movement, 
bypassing the institutional constraints of liberal democracy.9 As Jan Werner Muller has 
summarized this anti-pluralist and anti-liberal quality of populism: “Populists claim that they, 
and they alone, represent the people.”10 Nationalist populism in particular designates a nativist 
conceptualization of the people as ethno-cultural gemeinschaft, an exclusive national 
community of shared origin and destiny, both separated against the nefarious elites ‘above’ as 
those unwanted outsiders from ‘below’, while hailing the inherent superiority of the heartland, 
its people, and the nation they embody.11 Nativism or ‘xenophobic nationalism’ has been a 
hallmark of Donald Trump’s populist rhetoric from the beginning, regularly dehumanizing 
immigrants as ‘vermin,’ ‘infest’ and ‘animals’, while designating immigration from majority 
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Muslim countries as a national security threat.12 Beyond an analysis of populism as a top down 
phenomenon, as self-serving manipulation of the public by charismatic caudillios, however, 
successful mobilization requires confirmation and substantiation of populist discourses ‘from 
below’, whether in the forms of chants of ‘lock her up’ and ‘build the wall’ at Trump rallies, 
the multiplication of populist messaging via Twitter and social media, or the affirmation of 
populist policy positions in public opinion polls, national elections and plebiscites that 
confirms the populist framing of political issues. 
 
Several studies conducting public opinion survey research have suggested that there is wide-
spread general acceptance of populist attitudes among populations in Western countries 
regarding a Manichaean view of politics, the necessity to reclaim popular sovereignty, and a 
belief in a corrupt elite, including in the United States.13 However, for such latent popular 
sentiments of anti-elitism and people-centrism to become activated, both the framing of 
political and socio-economic grievances by populist figures and political entrepreneurs and a 
context of failed political representation are required.14 In advanced economies and mature 
democratic systems such as the United States, where clientelism and endemic corruption are 
less likely to be the cause of mass dissatisfaction with the political system, failure of 
representation occurs when voters feel that their legitimate concerns and grievances are no 
longer effectively responded to by the existing mechanisms of democratic government.15  
 
Both partisan polarization and public sentiments regarding the unresponsiveness of the 
American political system and its parties have steadily increased since 2010, reaching a 
highpoint previously seen in the mid-1990s, when the nationalist populist Pat Buchannan 
sought the presidential nomination for the Republican Party and the populist Ross Perot won 
20 per cent of the national vote in 1996.16 In the words of Trump’s campaign manager and 
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White House chief strategist Steve Bannon, Trump voters were disillusioned from a ‘rigged 
system’ that had let them down and primarily served the interests of a privileged few.17 Partisan 
polarization resulted in an American electorate that was increasingly divided between 
ideologically opposing camps.18 Voter coalitions were separated by race, gender, level of 
education and socio-economic status.19 The Republican coalition was predominantly made up 
of White, male, and older voters with a mid-level education and living in rural or suburban 
areas, while the Democratic coalition consisted of ethnic minorities, college-educated voters, 
urban populations and women.20 In Donald Trump’s White working-class voter base in the 
South and the Mid-West popular attitudes on immigration, the economy and the general 
direction of the country were diametrically opposed to those of Hillary Clinton and the 
Democratic Party, expressing above average scores in categories such as nativism, sentiments 
of anger, mistrust of the federal government, and economic pessimism among others.21  
 
67 per cent of Trump voters, for example, thought that free trade agreements had been bad for 
the United States, while 58 per cent of Clinton supporters held the opposite view before the 
election.22 An even greater number of 69 per cent agreed that immigrants were  a burden on 
the United States because ‘they take our jobs, housing and health care’, while only 47 per cent 
of non-Republicans agreed.23 Other figures showed that over 80 per cent of Republicans 
supported construction of an US-Mexican border wall, an issue that had become totemic for 
President Trump’s restrictive approach towards immigration and border security, while a clear 
majority 85 per cent of Democrats opposed it.24 Trump voters expressed a combination of 
political alienation, economic insecurity and cultural anxiety tied to the impact of globalization, 
changing demographics and immigration that were as much about questions of identity as they 
were about material concerns.25 Despite positive macro-economic indicators of economic 
growth and low unemployment in the United States following the recovery from the 2008 
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financial crisis, Trump voters’ subjective perception of their own economic situation and social 
status was one of relative deprivation and decline and loss of overall societal relevance and 
cultural hegemony.26  
 
As the economist Joseph Stiglitz has commented, the benefits of globalization were distributed 
unevenly between ‘winners’, such as advancing economies in Asia and the global 1% of 
income earners and the ‘losers’, the middle and working classes in advanced economies in the 
West, which had seen little to no real-time income gains for decades.27 Economists Shushanik 
Hakobyan and John McLaren found that while the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), a main target of Trump’s populist rhetoric against ‘bad deals’, had produced overall 
modest effects for most US workers, an important minority had suffered substantial income 
losses as a result of outsourcing and the decline of manufacturing jobs.28 It was these ‘losers’ 
of globalization in the United States that Trump would speak to in the 2019 State of the Union 
address: “I have met the men and women of Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Indiana, New 
Hampshire, and many other states whose dreams were shattered by the signing of NAFTA.”29 
Popular discontent  with the status quo opened the space for Trump’s populist messaging that 
combined disdain for the Washington establishment ‘swamp’ with promises of a national 
revival and renewal (‘Make America Great Again’) through economic protectionism, 
aggressive deregulation, and strict anti-migration measures together with a transactional focus 
on prioritizing US interests in international affairs.  
 
On issues of foreign policy and national security specifically, Trump’s nationalist populist 
rhetoric of establishment failure and restoring national greatness responded to a long existing 
gap between public opinion and elite attitudes on American global engagement, - from military 
intervention to free trade.30 Since at least the end of the Cold War, the US foreign policy 
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establishment continuously promoted a strategic vision that legitimated military interventions 
abroad, supported the unrivalled, global supremacy of American power and influence, and 
sought the country’s enduring hegemony in the international system. In following a grand 
strategy of liberal hegemony, the United States aimed to use its political influence, military 
power and economic weight to deter potential aggressors and preserve regional stability, foster 
the global spread of democracy, uphold the international rule of law, and guarantee free trade 
and open access to the global commons in support of a globalized economy.31 Liberal 
hegemony entailed both the primacy of American power that was to be perpetuated, and an 
activist political leadership role in support of Western liberalism, reflecting a deeply held and 
widely shared bipartisan elite consensus on American exceptionalism.32  
 
Data from the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR), which publishes a regular public 
opinion survey on Americans’ perspective of US foreign policy reveal that from 1974 to 2018 
between 66 and 70 per cent of Americans supported an active role of the United States in world 
affairs; a relatively stable figure for over four decades that nonetheless reveals a significant gap 
when compared to foreign policy leaders who nearly unanimously endorsed internationalism 
and active US leadership in world affairs.33 This discrepancy between the Washington elite 
consensus on liberal hegemony and public opinion was again reconfirmed in 2013, when a 
much-reported Pew research poll showed that 52 per cent of Americans agreed with the 
statement that the ‘United States should mind its own business internationally’.34 This was the 
highest percentage of popular support for what mainstream media and US foreign policy 
experts would describe as dangerous and irresponsible ‘isolationism’ since 1964. Although 
support for ‘isolationism’ declined to 43 per cent in 2016, 70 per cent of Americans polled still 
demanded a greater focus on domestic issues over foreign policy and 57 per cent agreed the 
US should ‘deal with its own problems and let other countries deal with their problems the best 
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they can’.35 On the issue of globalization, 49 per cent of Americans thought that involvement 
in the global economy was disadvantageous because it lowered wages and cost jobs.36 This 
again differed shapely from nearly unanimous elite support for further economic liberalization. 
Nearly three in four members of the Council on Foreign Relations, one of the most prestigious 
institutions of the foreign policy establishment in the United States, for example, thought that 
American companies moving overseas would be mostly beneficial for the US economy, while 
only 23 per cent among the general public agreed.37 In articulating America First as a 
nationalist populist vision of anti-globalism and anti-elitism Trump could  thus mobilize a long-
standing disconnect between elites and public opinion on the degree of US global engagement 
generally, while polarizing issues such as opposing free trade, or fortifying the US-Mexico 
border were simultaneously addressed to a particular voter segment of predominantly White 
working class voters, whose views on foreign policy and economic issues were not represented 
at the elite level, and who were overall more hostile toward globalization, internationalism and 
immigration than mainstream American society.  
 
Framing America First: nationalist anti-globalism and populist anti-elitism  
 
When Trump first outlined his America First approach in detail in a campaign speech in April 
2016, he focused on four core premises about America’s role and position in world politics: 
(1) the overextension of US engagement and existing foreign commitments; (2) the necessity 
for greater burden-sharing with allies and partners; (3) opposition to the Iran nuclear ‘deal’ and 
the rebuilding of trust with Israel and Saudi-Arabia, who had opposed the Obama 
administration’s Iran policy (4); and the restoration of respect for the United States and its 
power and influence abroad.38 Trump outlined a strategy that would get the United States ‘out 
of the nation-building business’ and instead refocus US efforts on counter-terrorism and the 
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defeat of Islamic State. To restore America’s reputation and global influence, its ‘military 
dominance’ would be rebuilt through increased defense expenditures after the Obama-era 
budget sequester, while Trump would seek to reframe relations with China and Russia and 
renegotiate existing arrangements with US allies and partners, from NAFTA to NATO. As one 
commentator put it: “Trump’s pronouncements may have lacked coherence, but the central 
message was clear: (…) America needed a radically different grand strategy.”39   
 
Overall, Trump’s strategic premise was anti-globalist rather than isolationist in nature. In 
supposedly prioritizing the economic interests of the American people, attacking the dismal 
failure of the collective (neo)liberal/(neo)conservative foreign policy establishment, and 
establishing a Manichean distinction between the people-centric approach of ‘America First’ 
and the ‘false song of globalism’, Trump charted a foreign policy course that directly linked 
populism, nationalism and realism. As Trump declared in his speech at the United Nations in 
2017, he was opposed to liberal internationalism, because globalization, trade liberalization, 
multilateralism and international institutions were hurting ordinary Americans:  
For too long, the American people were told that mammoth multinational trade deals, 
unaccountable international tribunals, and powerful global bureaucracies were the best 
way to promote their success. But as those promises flowed, millions of jobs vanished 
and thousands of factories disappeared.40  
Trump’s worldview cast the realm of international politics and external relations almost 
exclusively as one of existential threats, escalating danger and aggressive economic 
competition, a zero-sum game in which the United States had to compete against all other 
actors in order to secure its own survival and prosperity, regardless if they were liberal 
democracies or authoritarian regimes. As Trump declared before the United Nations General 
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Assembly: “As President of the United States, I will always put America first, just like you, as 
the leaders of your countries, will always, and should always, put your countries first.”41  
 
Trump expressed a realpolitik perspective of world politics that closely aligned with the 
international relations (IR) theory of (neo-)realism in that military and economic power alone 
determined a state’s national security and survival in the international system (Mearsheimer 
2001).42 National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster and Trump’s chief economic advisor Gary 
Cohn would accordingly frame America First in deliberate opposition to a liberal-
institutionalist view of international relations as a ‘global community’ in an op-ed for the Wall 
Street Journal, instead depicting the international system as an ‘arena where nations, 
nongovernmental actors and businesses engage and compete for advantage’.43 The ideational 
dimension of America First thus represented a deliberate break with the liberal Wilsonian 
tradition of US foreign policy and a strategic vision of cooperative engagement that sought to 
realize security and prosperity for the United States primarily in conjunction with US allies and 
partners and in support of a liberal world order at large.44 Trump reduced hegemony to an 
emphasis of American economic and military supremacy, decoupling it from the notion of 
American exceptionalism and the country’s identity as ‘indispensable’ world leader and global 
defender of freedom and democracy.45 In Trump’s rhetoric, the key geopolitical narrative of 
American decline and weakness and hostility toward liberal internationalism were mutually 
reinforcing elements in legitimizing America First. While not negating US cooperation and 
engagement altogether and retreating the United States into a 21st century neo-isolationism, 
Trump’s transactional understanding of international affairs measured American foreign policy 
successes in direct political gain and economic benefit to the United States, rather than in any 
joint commitment to universal values. Promotion of human rights and support for democracy 
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abroad therefore essentially ceased to be foreign policy priorities under the Trump 
administration.46 
 
Hostility towards the liberal international order and America’s role as its leader and primary 
guarantor, as well as attacking the associated costs in both security and economic terms were 
the most prominent hallmark of Trump’s blend of  anti-globalist nationalism and populist anti-
elitism.47 Politically, this had its clearest manifestations in Trump’s withdrawal from several 
key multilateral agreements, considered signature achievements of President Obama’s 
cooperative approach to US foreign and security policy, including the Trans Pacific Partnership 
agreement (TPP); the Paris climate change accord; and the Iran nuclear agreement.48 On trade, 
Trump focused on confronting China and other ‘unfair’ competitors of the United States, 
including Canada, Mexico, Germany and the European Union (EU) who had supposedly 
exploited the ‘bad deals’ negotiated by Trump’s globalist oriented predecessors, relying on 
populist appeals to legitimate his protectionist course: “In a Trump administration, we will 
negotiate trade deals on behalf of American workers – not on behalf of global corporations.”49 
Trump would subsequently use section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act to impose tariffs on 
imports of steel and aluminum from China, Canada, and the EU after a Commerce Department 
investigation determined them to be a threat to national security for degrading America’s 
industrial a base.50 Immigration in turn was similarly framed in a national security context, and 
identified almost exclusively as prevalent source of terrorism, violent crime and illegal drugs, 
as expressed in President Trump’s ban on immigration from seven majority Muslim countries 
to the United States in January 2017.51 Trump would frequently use exaggerated statistics and 
misleading statements to legitimate claims about thousands of potential terrorists and criminals 
supposedly apprehended at the US border and narrate anecdotes about ordinary Americans as 
victims of violent migrant criminals, mobilizing nativist resentment in support for his border 
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security and anti-immigration agenda, in particular construction of the US-Mexican border wall 
to ‘stop the gangs and the violence, and to stop the drugs from pouring into our communities’.52  
 
Anti-globalism also informed Trump’s publicly stated views on NATO as ‘obsolete’ and 
repeated attacks on NATO member states, Germany in particular, for failing the NATO target 
of committing 2 per cent of national GDP for defense spending.53 In Trump’s assessment other 
countries ‘owed’ the United States ‘vast sums’ of money for underspending and neglecting 
their NATO commitments; a view that he also repeatedly publicized via Twitter.54 Trump’s 
behavior toward authoritarian leaders like North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un, Vladimir Putin, 
Rodrigo Duterte, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, or Xi Jinping was in contrast predominantly one of 
appreciation and respect, - at one point declaring on Twitter that he and Kim had fallen ‘in 
love’ -, despite longstanding and persistent rivalries with the United States and significant 
disagreement on a range of policy issues, from North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme to 
Chinese trade practices and Russian revisionism in Eastern Europe.55 What these authoritarian 
leaders and Trump had in common, however, was their hostility towards the principles of 
liberal democracy at home and the rules-based international order abroad. In deemphasizing 
the global leadership role of the United States, America First was indirectly advancing Russian 
and Chinese ambitions for a multipolar world order and a return of traditional geopolitics and 
regional spheres of influence, despite continued US opposition to China’s land reclamation 
activities and increasing militarization of the South China Sea, and Putin’s annexation of 
Crimea in practice.56  
 
Some of Trump’s harshest and most persistent criticism, was accordingly reserved for the 
leaders of longstanding American allies, including Chancellor Angela Merkel and Prime 
Minister Justin Trudeau, which sought to defend the existing international system against 
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revisionist challengers, amongst which counties like Germany and Canada increasingly 
counted Trump himself, if not the United States as a whole.57 What separated Trump from 
previous administrations that had quarreled over the imbalance of financial and military 
commitments within the alliance was that Trump questioned the benefit of the very existence 
of NATO to the United States, seeing it predominantly as unwarranted American subsidization 
of the security of wealthy European countries at the expense of US taxpayers. At the same 
time, however, the United States continued to substantially support the NATO alliance in 
practice, reinforcing the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI), launched under President 
Obama and designed as deterrence mechanism to counter potential Russian aggression in 
Eastern Europe by $1.4 billion, an increase of 40% to almost $5 billion in the fiscal year 2017.58 
US troops also made up the largest contingent for Trident Juncture in Norway, providing more 
than 14.000 troops, including an aircraft carrier strike group, for the largest NATO exercise 
since the end of the Cold War.59 More than 8.000 US troops continued to be stationed in NATO 
bases in Eastern Europe on a rotational basis, and plans for a permanent US military 
installation, potentially named ‘Fort Trump’ were discussed between US and Polish officials.60  
Trump also authorized the sale of advanced anti-tank missiles and other lethal military 
equipment to Ukraine and did not veto enhanced sanctions against Russia mandated by 
Congress in response to Russian aggression in Ukraine and the Kremlin’s interference with 
American elections.61 On the issue of North-Korea’s nuclear program, Trump oscillated 
between high-level diplomatic overtures and threatening massive military strikes (‘fire and 
fury’), including with nuclear weapons, but was generally upholding traditional US opposition 
towards nuclear proliferation.62 The Trump administration also reaffirmed security guarantees 
for Japan and South Korea and increased military activities in the Asia-Pacific, such as the US 
Navy’s ‘freedom of navigation’ exercises, including dispatches of US Navy vessels through 
the Taiwan Strait.63      
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As these examples illustrate, there was an obvious discrepancy between the anti-globalist 
preferences expressed in Trump’s nationalist populist rhetoric and the practical consequences 
for US foreign policy and national security. On the one hand, America First faced the same 
practical obstacles arising from the difficulties to coordinate and implement policy changes 
across the vast national security bureaucracy, as well as operational realities present in 
America’s ongoing military conflicts that had plagued the strategic aspirations of previous 
post-Cold War administrations.64 On the other hand, Trump also faced resistance by the foreign 
policy and national security establishment itself, including the Pentagon, State Department, 
and from within his own White House.65 With the departure of McMaster, Tillerson and Mattis, 
Trump would fill key positions for national security with conservative nationalists and 
technocrats more aligned with America First’s emphasis of national sovereignty and trans-
actionalism. Against a structural geopolitical reorientation of the United States, like closer 
strategic alignment with Russia or withdrawal from NATO, however, Trump continued to face 
significant and bipartisan opposition and legal obstacles by Congress, as well as hostility in 
American public opinion.66  
 
Rather than ushering in radical policy changes in practice, such as a visible reduction of US 
troop levels in South Korea, Germany or Japan, or even wholesale US withdrawal from NATO, 
Trump’s nationalist populist agenda, therefore, primarily had a negative impact on the global 
perception of American leadership and its political reliability among its allies and partners.67  
 
In the words of Angela Merkel, the ‘times in which we could completely depend on others are, 
to a certain extent, over.’ Public opinion polls seemed to concur with this assessment., 
demonstrating that global publics in twenty-five countries had less confidence in Trump than 
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in either the authoritarian leaders of Russia and China, or liberal stalwarts like Trudeau and 
Merkel, while favorability ratings of the United States were much lower under Trump than 
under Barack Obama.68 In Germany, only 10 per cent of respondents had confidence in Trump, 
while three-in-four people thought that the United States under his presidency was doing less 
to address global problems.69 Support for Trump was higher, however, among supporters of 
European populist parties, and majority positive attitudes towards the United States prevailed 
in many countries.70 Trump’s repeatedly expressed hostility towards the liberal international 
order, including disruptive performances at high-profile G-7 and NATO summits would not 
radically alter US foreign policy in the short term, but it affected the medium to long-term 
strategic calculations regarding American grand strategy among both US allies and 
adversaries.71 America First together with Brexit would, for example, give renewed urgency to 
an intra-European debate regarding the EU’s strategic autonomy in the 21st century and the 
necessity for greater German responsibility for European defense and security.72 
 
America’s international partners began to hedge as much against the momentary volatility 
under Trump as against the possibility of long-term US retrenchment, calculating that while 
the Trump presidency was the symptom, the underlying cause was a United States, whose 
population and political class were no longer as willing and able to underwrite the global Pax 
Americana with its blood and treasure. Trump’s nationalist populism acted as a rhetorical 
accelerator to a dynamic that was rooted in structural demographic and economic shifts that 
would make the United States primus inter pares in a post-American World rather than sole 
global superpower, a shift towards a less hegemonic role that was ultimately welcomed by a 
majority of the American people, who envisioned a shared global leadership role of their 
country, while outright nationalism still remained a minority position among the electorate.73 
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America First and the foreign policy establishment 
 
While America First constituted an external challenge for allies and partners of the United 
States, Trump also successfully mobilized foreign policy as a domestic issue, framing the 
liberal-internationalist foreign policy vision of Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton as ‘complete 
and total disaster’, while attacking the wholesale failure of the collective US foreign policy 
establishment.74 Until the election of Trump, this professional networked elite of national 
security officials, members of Congress, Washington DC think tanks, journalists, pundits, and 
academics had exercised a virtually unchallenged dominance over defining the common-sense 
status and legitimate position on US foreign policy and national security, resulting in a 
Washington consensus on liberal hegemony, global military primacy and US engagement that 
continuously reaffirmed America’s exceptional and indispensable leadership role in world 
politics and the existential necessity for the continued pursuit of American primacy.75 
 
An alternative strategic vision of restraint was regularly denounced as politically irresponsible 
and morally reprehensibly isolationism, including when attacking Obama’s reluctance to 
militarily intervene in Syria, or denouncing any cuts to the American defense budget. 
Dissatisfaction with the foreign policy establishment’s dogmatic position, its perceived lack of 
political nuance and habitual promotion of military interventionism had given rise to the 
derogatory label of the ‘Blob’, a moniker awarded by Ben Rhodes, Obama’s foreign policy 
speech writer and deputy national security advisor.76 According to Rhodes, the ‘Blob’ included 
Hillary Clinton, Robert Gates and supporters of the Iraq War in both parties as well as foreign 
policy experts, think tanks and elite media outlets like the Washington Post and the New 
Yorker. While Rhodes’ criticism had targeted the foreign policy establishment’s opposition 
towards President Obama’s policies on Syria and Iran in particular, Trump’s attacks were 
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farmed in nationalist populist terms, as overdue opposition against a borderline treasonous 
globalist cabal that betrayed the ideal of ‘Americanism’: 
 
They're all part of the same political establishment. They go to the same restaurants, 
they attend the same conferences, they have the same friends and connections. They all 
support the same ideology of globalism that makes them rich while shipping your jobs, 
your factories, and your wealth to other countries.77  
 
In his opposition to American leadership of the liberal international order and questioning of 
the internationalist premise of American exceptionalism, Trump posed an unprecedented 
challenge to the political dominance of the foreign policy establishment and its advocacy of 
liberal hegemony.78 The significance of this perceived threat was illustrated by the wholesale 
denunciation of Trump’s rhetoric and policies by the ‘Blob’, which went far beyond previous 
attacks on Obama’s ‘leading from behind’ stance, George W. Bush’s overreach in Iraq, or the 
lacking strategic coherence of Bill Clinton. Both Republican and Democratic foreign policy 
and national security experts, leading Washington think tanks like the Council on Foreign 
Relations and national and international media outlets from the Atlantic to the Financial Times 
attacked Trump for abdicating from global leadership and retreating into an ill-conceived 
transactional nationalism.79 A letter signed by over fifty GOP foreign policy experts and former 
national security officials, part of a wider network of conservative ‘Never Trumpers’, that was 
published in the New York Times in August 2016 declared that Trump not only lacked the 
‘character, values and experience’ to be President, but that he risked the ‘country’s national 
security and well-being’.80  
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These critics viewed Trump as genuine threat to the survival of a liberal world order and the 
geopolitical cohesion of the West due to his decades-long hostility towards free trade, US 
alliances and international cooperation.81 Trump in turn outlined ‘principled realism’ as a 
foreign policy strategy that would ‘not be held hostage to the dogmas, discredited ideologies, 
and so-called experts who have been proven wrong over the years, time and time again’ given 
the failures of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and their inability to prevent rival powers like 
China and close US allies such as Germany from taking advantage of the United States.82  
 
In criticizing the Washington establishment for its dismal track-record of ‘failed policies and 
continued losses in war’ and misguided promotion of an activist foreign policy agenda, 
America First partially reflected the concerns of a deviant group of foreign policy critics in the 
United States.83 This heterogeneous coalition of libertarian conservatives; progressive critics 
of American foreign policy; and neorealist IR scholars advocated the retrenchment of US 
power to varying degrees and favored an overall American grand strategy of restraint.84 Realist 
critics in particular seemingly concurred with Trump’s noninterventionist leanings and anti-
establishment critique, as they characterized the foreign policy community in the United States 
as ‘dysfunctional’ and ‘disdainful of alternative perspectives’.85 However, Trump’s overall 
lack of strategic coherence and consistency, poor attention to policy planning and 
implementation, and, at times, dysfunctional White House administration made any 
identification of America First as a genuine Trump Doctrine or grand strategy highly 
doubtful.86  
 
As realists themselves would point out, the combination of the President’s political and 
personal deficiencies, together with his protectionist and nativist impulses and continued large-
scale security commitments towards wealthy allies like Japan, South Korea and the European 
 20 
NATO partners, made it obvious that America First was not a realist grand strategy of offshore 
balancing.87 Strategic incoherence was constantly on display with Trump, who seemingly 
endorsed the hawkish positions of political advisors like Bolton and Pompeo and engaged in 
bellicose rhetoric towards opponents like North-Korea and Iran, but would prioritize 
diplomatic overtures towards Kim Jong-un and call off air strikes against Iran in retaliation for 
the downing of a US reconnaissance drone, citing predicted Iranian casualties as reason for his 
restraint. Yet, the inconsistency between a nationalist populist rhetoric of fundamental change 
and renewal and relative policy continuity was also the result of Trump’s personnel choices. 
Trump would repeatedly turn to seasoned establishment figures to fill key positions for national 
security, including Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster as his second National Security Advisor 
following the resignation of Lieutenant General Michael Flynn from the role, General James 
Mattis as Secretary of Defense, and General John Kelly, first as Secretary for Homeland 
Security and then as his second White House Chief of Staff. These long-serving insiders of the 
national security state were seen as safe pair of hands and the ‘adults in the room’ that would 
reign in Trump’s nationalist-populist impulses, check the influence of the anti-globalist wing 
around policy advisers Steve Bannon and Steven Miller, and guarantee strategic continuity.88  
 
In identifying rogue regimes, international terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) as some of the most significant threats facing the United States, Trump 
and his administration would indeed essentially remain within established parameters of 
mainstream US national security thinking, and not fundamentally alter the threat perceptions 
and strategic rationales of Trump’s immediate predecessors in office.89 In reemphasizing 
American global military primacy and the threat of WMD-armed rogue regimes, in particular 
North Korea and Iran, both members of Bush’s ‘axis of evil’, Trump’s 2017 National Security 
Strategy (NSS) partially reproduced the geostrategic focus of the Bush administration.90 Even 
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the Trump administration’s renewed strategic focus regarding great power coemption with 
near-peer rivals like Russia and China in a more competitive international environment had 
been somewhat foreshadowed in Obama’s last NSS document of 2015, and an increased US 
military presence in the Asia-Pacific following Obama’s ‘pivot to Asia’ in 2011/2012.91   
 
Where Trump’s ‘principled realism’ primarily counteracted the liberal-institutionalist vision of 
Obama and Clinton, America First’s anti-globalism simultaneously drew from a legitimate and 
long-established foreign policy tradition in its emphasis of Jacksonian unilateralism and 
military supremacy that promoted a considerable degree of continuity in conservative foreign 
policy thinking and practice.92 Mike Pompeo, who followed Tillerson as Secretary of State and 
John Bolton, who replaced McMaster as National Security Advisor were considered outspoken 
foreign policy hawks, especially in considering military options against Iran; their overall 
perspective, however, reflected a traditional neoconservative preference for unilateralism, the 
pre-emptive use of military power against perceived threats to US national security and 
interests, and the perpetuation of the unipolar primacy of the United States both economically 
and militarily.93 Trump promoted several policies in line with traditional neoconservative 
preferences, such as staunch support for Israel including recognition of Jerusalem as its capital; 
growing defense spending, requesting $750 billion for the fiscal year 2020 after substantial 
increases in 2017, 2018 and 2019 of more than $133 billion in total; and withdrawing the 
United States from the UN Human Rights Council for its anti-Israel and anti-American bias.94  
 
America First, however, was not simply a perpetuation of neoconservative orthodoxy in foreign 
policy; it advanced a declinist narrative of American weakness as direct result of the foreign 
establishment’s misguided globalism and interventionism in the public sphere that found a 
particular strong echo among GOP voters, where over 80 per cent of Republicans supported 
 22 
Trump’s foreign policy restraint and his promise of an American national revival.95 This 
popular support forced many establishment conservatives to prioritize their nationalist-
unilateral vision of US foreign policy over their support for an activist promotion of human 
rights and globally advancing the cause of liberal democracy and free trade.96 
 
America First had thus successfully challenged the notion that liberal hegemony was without 
legitimate alternative in the public sphere and political discourse. Two major Democratic 
presidential candidates for the 2020 presidential election, Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren 
would in turn outline progressive foreign policy platforms both in opposition to Trump’s 
America First nationalism and excessive defense spending, continued military interventions 
overseas, the Afghanistan War and US support for the Saudi war in Yemen.97 Research by 
Gallup revealed that the American electorate in 2019 was almost evenly split between 
supporters of the neoconservative (21 percent) and liberal-internationalist (27 per cent) 
variations of American primacy and liberal hegemony and supporters of variants of restraint, 
from nationalist populists (9 per cent) to ‘diplomatic realists’ (21 per cent) and 
‘isolationists/pacifists’ (18 per cent), concluding that there was no longer a ‘single, coherent, 
national strategic vision (if there ever was one) for how the U.S. should face the rest of the 
world.’98 Trump’s nationalist populist intervention against the US foreign policy establishment 
resulted in the most intense debate on the fundamental principles, normative assumptions, and 
political, economic and military costs and benefits of US foreign policy and American grand 
strategy since the end of the Cold War, forcing both Republicans and Democrats to explore 






To what extent has populism impacted US foreign policy under the Trump administration? As 
this article has argued, Donald Trump has successfully exploited a long-standing gap between 
public opinion and the foreign policy establishment on the overall degree of US engagement 
abroad. Trump’s nationalist populist vision of America First, at the same time, mobilized 
sentiments of political alienation, economic insecurity and cultural anxiety felt by a particular 
segment of American voters regarding globalization, immigration and changing demographics, 
in order to legitimate a fundamental remake of US foreign, economic and immigration policies. 
The main political effects of this nationalist populist reframing of US foreign policy were to 
challenge global perceptions of US engagement and international leadership abroad, and to 
erode the ideological dominance of the US foreign policy establishment’s advocacy of liberal 
hegemony at home. America First combined populist anti-elitism against the Washington 
‘swamp’ and the supporters of liberal hegemony in politics, think tanks and the media with a 
nationalist anti-globalism that prioritized the national interest of the United States over its 
longstanding commitment to and leadership of a rules-based international order. This had its 
clearest manifestations in Trump’s economic protectionism and anti-immigration policies. At 
the same time, there was a considerable disconnect between the populist and anti-globalist 
rhetoric of America First and its practical consequences for US foreign policy, for example, in 
the United States’ continued and even enhanced support for the NATO alliance or US partners 
in Asia. On the one hand, Trump’s nationalist populist course faced continued resistance from 
within his government, the courts and American public opinion. More significantly, however, 
President Trump’s endorsement of Jacksonian unilateralism and neoconservative primacy 
resulted in foreign policies that were not a radical departure from established practice and a 




America First would therefore not signal the end of the liberal international order per se, but 
its populist intervention against the establishment successfully disrupted the political status quo 
and highlighted a shift in the foreign policy debate in both mainstream parties in the United 
States towards recognizing that restraint could not simply be dismissed as ill-advised 
isolationism, but had to be considered as legitimate strategic alternative. The most significant 
political impact of Trump’s nationalist populist rhetoric of America First was therefore 
ideational.100 In challenging the political dominance of the foreign policy establishment, Trump 
opened the door for a potential recalibration of American grand strategy away from the 
bipartisan consensus on liberal hegemony and towards realignment between elite and popular 
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